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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DORA SCHREITER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
WASATCH MANOR, INC.,
Case No. 920573-CA
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
DORA SCHREITER
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT
ON APRIL 22, 1992
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Dora Schreiter brings this appeal from the
decision

of the Third Judicial

County,

State

against

the

of Utah

appellant

wherein
on April

District Court
summary
22,

judgment

1992.

jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2) (j) .

of Salt Lake
was

This

entered

Court has

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the plaintifffs burden of proof in opposing

the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment include presenting
evidence on the cost of installing a sprinkler system at Wasatch
Manor?

The Court reviews this issue using a de novo standard.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
2.

Did the plaintifffs burden of proof in opposing

the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment include presenting
evidence of the financial ability of Wasatch Manor to pay for the
cost of installing the sprinkler system?
issue using a de novo standard.

The Court reviews this

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497

(Utah 1989).
3.

In the event the response to issues one and two is

affirmative, did the plaintiff present prima facie evidence on
the cost of a sprinkler system and the economic ability of the
defendant to install it?
novo standard.
4.

The Court reviews this issue using a de

Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
Did the Court properly exclude under Rule 407,

Utah Rules of Evidence testimony from Burton Miller, the manager
of Wasatch Manor, of the fact that after the February 7, 1990
fire

the

defendant

obtained

an

estimate

for

installing

a

sprinkler system of between $185,000 and $200,000 at Wasatch
Manor?

This Court reviews this issue using a de novo standard.

Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
The following rules are determinative in this appeal:
U.R.C.P. Rule 56(c).
. . . The judgment sought shall be
rendered
forthwith
if
the
pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on
file together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. . ..
Utah Rules of Evidence 407 titled "Subsequent Remedial Measures"
When, after an event, measures are
taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less
likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent
measures
is not
admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct in connection with
the event.
This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence
of subsequent measures when offered
for another purpose, such as
proving ownership, control, or
feasibility
of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.
S T A T E M E N T
A.

OF

THE

CASE

Nature of the case
On February 7, 1990, Appellant (hereafter "Schreiter")

was an 83-year old woman who lived on the tenth floor of a highrise retirement complex, Wasatch Manor.

Early on the morning of

February 7, 1990, she awoke to see flames outside of her window
and smell smoke in her apartment.
3

A fire had started in the room

of another tenant on the same floor when he fell asleep while
smoking

in bed.

Schreiter sustained permanent and disabling

injuries due to smoke inhalation from the fire.
expenses exceed $50,000.

Her medical

Although she ultimately recovered to

some extent from her injuries, she is nevertheless left with a
significant degree of permanent disability from the fire.
At the time of the fire, Wasatch Manor had no sprinkler
system installed.

The Uniform Building Code in effect at the

time Wasatch Manor was constructed did not require a sprinkler
system.

However, Wasatch Manor is an eleven story building

designed to serve as a retirement home for the elderly.

In

addition, Wasatch Manor permitted and was aware of smoking within
the building and required that individuals smoking do so in their
rooms rather than the common areas.

Wasatch Manorfs manager was

concerned about the potential fire hazard smokers posed to the
building and to other tenantfs safety.
Schreiter brought a claim against Wasatch Manor based
on negligence for failing to remedy or mitigate a foreseeable
hazard when they did not retrofit the building with a sprinkler
system.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that

Schreiter bore the burden of proof to show both the cost of
installing a sprinkler system at the building and the financial
ability of the defendant to pay for such a and that she had
failed to produce prima facie evidence on both points.

The Court

granted the Motion for Summary Judgment and an Order to that
effect was entered on May 22, 1992.
4

B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition.
A trial date was originally set for this case on May

11,

1992.

However,

due

to

difficulty

in obtaining

expert

testimony as to the degree to which sprinklers would have been
effective in limiting the spread of the fire at Wasatch Manor,
Schreiter moved to continue trial of the case approximately one
month before the trial date and before the defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment was filed.

The Motion to Continue Trial was

granted in a telephone conference between the Court and counsel
on Thursday, April 30, 1982.
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed
on April 23, 1992.

Following the submission of briefs in support

and in opposition to the motion the matter came on for hearing
before the Court on May 8, 1992.

The Court ruled on the motion

at the end of the hearing and the Order granting the motion was
entered on May 22, 1992. Schreiter filed her Notice of Appeal on
June 18, 1992.
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Sometime in the early morning of February 7, 1990,

a fire broke out on the tenth floor of Wasatch Manor Retirement
Home.

Plaintifffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment, R.440, paragraph 1.
2.

Dora Schreiter, a 83-year old resident of Wasatch

Manor, resided on the tenth floor at the time the fire broke out.
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, R.440, paragraph 2.
5
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Wasatch Manor is an 11-story apartment building

with the majority of its tenants being retired elderly people.
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, R.441, paragraph 3.
4.

The fire started in the room of Gerald O'Hara,

another tenant of Wasatch Manor who also lived on the tenth floor
of

the

building.

Plaintiff's

Memorandum

in

Opposition

to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.441, paragraph 4.
5.
smoking

in

The fire started when Mr. O'Hara fell asleep while
bed.

Defendant's Motion
6.

Plaintiff's
for Summary

Memorandum

in

Opposition

to

Judgment, R.441, paragraph 5.

At the time of the fire Wasatch Manor had no

sprinkler system installed on the tenth floor in the building.
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, R.441, paragraph 6.
7.

The Uniform Building Code in effect at the time

Wasatch Manor was constructed did not require a sprinkler system
for

the

building.

Defendant's Motion
8.

Plaintiff's Memorandum
for Summary

Wasatch

Manor

in Opposition

to

Judgment, R.441, paragraph 7.

did

not

require

retired individuals to leave the building.

non-ambulatory

Each tenant made

their own determination about whether they left the retirement
home when they became non-ambulatory.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.441,
paragraph 8.
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9.

Smoking is permitted in the building except in the

common areas and Wasatch Manor is aware of smokers living in the
building.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment, R.441# paragraph 9.
10.

Wasatch Manor has specifically indicated to its

tenants that if they smoke they should stay in their apartments.
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, R.441, paragraph 10.
11.
the

fact

The manager of Wasatch Manor was concerned about

that

the tenants

potential fire hazard.
Manor was not only
potential

fire

smoking

in the building posed a

The concern of the manager of Wasatch

for the individuals' health but for the

hazard

to

the

tenants

in

the

building.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, R.442, paragraph 11.
12.

After

the

fire, the manager

of Wasatch Manor

observed that the condition of the tenth floor was "devastated,
pretty well burned-out."

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.442, paragraph 12.
13.

After the fire Wasatch Manor received an estimate

for the cost of installing a sprinkler system in the building in
the general area of $185,000 to $200,000.

Plaintiff's Memorandum

in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.442,
paragraph 13.
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14.

Wasatch Manor remodeled the their building in 1984

for the cost of approximately $500,000.

Plaintiff's Memorandum

in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.442,
paragraph 14.
15.

As part of the remodeling, the patios on the tenth

floor were sealed in with windows.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.442,
paragraph 15.
16.

The cost of cleaning up the building from the

February 7, 1990 fire was approximately $350,000.
Memorandum

in

Opposition

to

Defendant's

Motion

Plaintiff's
for

Summary

Judgment, R.442, paragraph 16; Exhibit "A", R.449-450.
17.
damage

to

Memorandum

The nature of Schreiter's injuries was primarily

her
in

lungs

from

Opposition

to

smoke

inhalation.

Defendant's

Motion

Plaintiff's
for

Summary

Judgment, R.442, paragraph 17.
18.

The medical expenses for Schreiter exceed $50,000.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, R.442, paragraph 18.
19.

Hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion to Continue the

Trial Date in the case was held by telephonic conference on
Thursday, April 30, 1992, at 9:00 a.m.

At that time the Court

agreed to continue the trial date in the case.

Notice of Hearing

dated April 24, 1992, R.368-369; Minute Entry, R.439; Order on
Motion to Continue, dated June 1, 1992, R.489-490.
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20.

At oral argument on the defendants Motion for.

Summary Judgment on May 8, 1992 the defendant agreed that a fire
sprinkler system at Wasatch Manor would have been effective in
limiting the scope and extent of the fire.

The Motion for

\Summary Judgment was presented solely on the questions as to
whether the plaintiff was required to show as an element of her
proof (1) the cost of installing a sprinkler system and (2) the
ability of Wasatch Manor to pay for those costs and whether such
proof was presented.

Order dated May 22, 1992, R.484, paragraph

2; R.485, paragraph 6; and R.486, paragraph 2.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Of the four standard elements of a plaintiff's burden
of proof in a negligence case, the defendant challenged in their
Motion for Summary Judgment only the first two, the existence of
a duty on the part of Wasatch Manor and the breach of that duty.
Based on all the circumstances surrounding the event, Schreiter
presented prima facie evidence on which a jury could impose a
duty

on

Wasatch

Manor

to

install

a

sprinkler

system.

In

addition, Schreiter presented evidence of the specific cost of
installing a fire sprinkler system in the building.

The Court

erred in excluding this evidence under Rule 407 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.
The Court also erred in requiring that as part of her
prima

facie case Schreiter prove that Wasatch Manor had the

ability to pay for the cost of installing a sprinkler system.
Proof of financial ability to instill what a jury may find as a
9

reasonable

precautionary

safety

measure

is not

part

of the

plaintiff's prima facie case but is, at best, a defense for the
defendant to raise and prove.

Moreover, Schreiter did present

information that sustained any prima facie burden of proof that
may have existed to show that the defendant had the assets to
install such a sprinkler system.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
LIMITED TO CHALLENGING WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF HAD PRESENTED A
PRIMA FACIE CASE ON THE EXISTENCE OF A DUTY AND A BREACH OF
THAT DUTY BY WASATCH MANOR.
In sustaining any negligence claim the plaintiff must

show:

"(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to

plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty, (3) the causation, both
actually and proximately, of injury; and (4) the suffering of
damages by the plaintiff."

Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723,726

(Utah 1985).
The last two elements of Schreiter's prima facie were
not contested in the defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.

As

for damages, no one has ever suggested the Dora Schreiter was not
severely injured as a result of the Wasatch Manor fire.

With

regard to actual and proximate cause, the defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment initially contained an argument that Schreiter
had not presented a prima facie case showing a link between the
harm suffered by Schreiter and the lack of a fire sprinkler
system at Wasatch Manor.

Schreiter disputed this.

However, at

the oral argument of the case on May 8, 1992, the defendant
conceded that for purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment
10

causation was not an issue.
6; R.486, paragraph 2.

R.484, Paragraph 2; R.485, paragraph

The parties accordingly did not address

the actual and proximate cause issue in oral argument nor did the
Court base its ruling to any extent on a finding or conclusion
that

actual

R.483-488.
be

limited

and

proximate

cause had

not been

demonstrated.

Consequently, the scope of this Court's review should
to whether

the

Court

erred

in determining

that

Schreiter failed to show a duty on the part of the defendant and
a breach of that duty.
II.

SCHREITER HAS PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CASE AS TO THE
EXISTENCE OF A DUTY ON THE PART OF WASATCH MANOR AND A
BREACH OF THAT DUTY.
A.

Applicable
Judgment.

Legal

Principles

relating

to

Summary

Utah case law is replete with references that summary
judgment

should be granted with great

cases.

Williams v. Melbv.

699

P.2d

caution
723, 725

in negligence
(Utah

English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah App 1989)..

1985).
This is

because "issues of negligence ordinarily present questions of
fact to be resolved by the fact finder."

Apache Tank Lines, Inc.

v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985).

Summary judgment is

reserved for only the most clear cut negligence cases.
Salt Lake Cityf 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam).
reason

summary

judgment

should be granted

Ingram v.
Another

in only the most

obvious cases is that, as stated in Williams v. Melby, supra:
Whether a defendant has breached
the required standard of care is
generally a question for the jury,
to be determined by whether the
injury which occurred was of the
11

type that fell within the zone of
risk created by the defendant's
negligent conduct. 'The care to be
exercised in anv particular case
depends upon the circumstances of
that case and on the extent of
foreseeable danger involved and
must be determined as a question of
fact.'
Supra at 727, citations omitted, emphasis added, quoting DCR Inc.
v. Peak Alarm Co, 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1985).
The appellate court should view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom

in a light most

favorable to the losing party when facing the appeal of a summary
Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981).

judgment ruling.
B.

Whether Wasatch Manor had a duty to retrofit the
building with a sprinkler system is a question of fact.
A number of Utah cases have outlined standards of care

and the duties required of landlords when tenants have been
injured.

Landlord liability is not limited by the categories

established in common law, but the landlord's duty is to exercise
reasonable care toward tenants in all circumstances.
suprar at 726.
the

Uniform

Williams,

Importantly, Williams holds that compliance with

Building

Code

does

not

preclude

a

finding

of

negligence on the part of a designer or owner of a building.
Supra at 728.
prudent

landlord

The Williams Court held that if a reasonably
knew

or

should

have

known

of

a dangerous

condition in a building despite compliance with building code,
the landlord could be held liable for not taking adequate safety
precautions.

Id.

12

Williams relied to some extent on the case of Becker v.
IRM Corp.. 698 P.2d 116 (Cal. 1985).

In the Becker case a tenant

brought a claim against his landlord when he suffered injuries
after falling against untempered frosted glass in a shower door
of an apartment he was leasing.
liability and negligence.

He brought claims of strict

The trial court granted a defense

motion for summary judgment on the basis that there was no duty
to any injured tenant for a latent defect absent actual knowledge
or a contractual or statutory duty.

The California Supreme Court

reversed on the basis that a genuine issue of fact existed.

The

Court stated:
. . . A landlord in caring for his
property must act toward his tenant
as a reasonable person under all
the circumstances, including the
likelihood of injury, the probable
seriousness of injury, the burden
of reducing or avoiding the risk,
and his degree of control over the
risk-creating defect.
Supra at 125.
Likewise, the Court

in Williams reversed the trial

courtfs summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis
that, despite complete compliance with the building code, a jury
could still find the landlord negligent given all the facts and
circumstances of the case.
Other cases in Utah echo the theme of Williams v. Melby
that the existence of a duty on the part of a landlord is
dependant upon the particular facts and circumstances of the

13

case.

DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Company. 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah

1985).

As stated in Erickson v. Wasatch Manor. Inc., 802 P.2d

1323, 1327 (Utah App. 1990), the landlord of a building has a
"duty to observe any dangerous condition known to him or which by
the use of reasonably diligence would have become known to him
and take reasonable steps to remedy or remove any such dangerous
condition."

Meece v. Briqham Young University» 639 P.2d 720, 723

(Utah 1981) provides:
Negligence is the failure to do what a
reasonable and prudent person would have done
under the circumstances or doing what such
person under such circumstances would have
done. The fault may be in acting or omitting
to act.
A corollary to that definition is
the in the exercise of ordinary care, the
amount of caution required may vary in
accordance with the nature of the act and
surrounding circumstances.
The undisputed facts in the context of this particular
case are that Wasatch Manor is an 11-story retirement home in
which elderly people who may been limited in their ambulation
live.

Smokers are also in the building.

These individuals are

told they may not smoke in the common areas of the building and
if they smoke they should do so in their apartments.

The manager

of Wasatch Manor admitted he was concerned about the tenantfs
smoking endangering their own physical health and the safety of
other individuals in the building.

The threat of injury from a

smokerfs cigarette lighting a bed on fire at night is clearly
foreseeable.

It is also foreseeable that individuals in the

building may have significant difficulty in escaping this danger.
The difficulty of fighting a fire from ladder trucks in a high
14

rise

building

is

also

common

knowledge.

This

information

combines to create an issue of fact as to the duty of Wasatch
Manor and whether the failure to install a sprinkler system was a
breach of that duty.
C.

To the extent necessary to fulfill Schreiter's prima
facie obligation, admissible evidence exists to show
the cost of installing a sprinkler system in the
building.
Schreiter

has

not

only

shown

that

a

jury

could

reasonably find a duty to retrofit the building with a sprinkler
system,

she has presented prima

facie evidence that such a

precautionary measure is feasible.

A key portion of the Court's

ruling is that information presented by Schreiter through the
defendant's building manager, Burton Miller, was inadmissible
under Rule 407.

Mr. Miller stated that after the fire Wasatch

Manor obtained an estimate that the cost of retrofitting the
building with a sprinkler system was $185,000 to $200,000.
Court ruled

The

incorrectly that Rule 407 of the Utah Rules of

Evidence precluded such information from being presented to the
jury.
Rule

407 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

"Subsequent Remedial Measures" and states:
When, after an event, measures are
taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less
likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent
measures
is not
admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct in connection with
the event.
This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence

15

is titled

of subsequent measures when offered
for another purpose, such as
proving ownership, control, or
feasibility
of
precautionary
measures, if controverted, or
impeachment. [emphasis added]
Prohibiting presentation of this information was error for two
reasons.

First, obtaining the estimate for the installation of

the sprinkler system was not a "subsequent remedial measure" as
contemplated under the rule.

By itself, the estimate itself is

not a measure taken after the fire which, if obtained before
February 7, 1990, would have made the fire less likely.

As such,

the estimate is not information that can be restricted under Rule
407.
Second,

the

Court

ruled

in

its

Order

that

the

"feasibility exemption [under Rule 407] applies only if there is
an

issue

as

to

whether

or

not

the

fire

sprinkling

system

physically can be installed." R.487. This is clearly error.

The

plain language of Rule 407 does not limit the scope of the
feasibility exemption in any such manner. There is no rational
basis for allowing the feasibility exemption to be modified to
include information directed to "mechanical" or "engineering"
feasibility and exclude information relating to "financial" or
"economic"

feasibility.

Cases

from

other

jurisdictions

interpreting the meaning of "feasibility" in this context have
not limited it in the way the defendant argues.

Reese v. Mercury

Marine Division of Brunswick Corp, 793 F.2d 1416, 1428 (5th Cir.
1986); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corporation, 281 N.E.2d 749,
753 (111. App. 1972).
16

In fact, the evidence Schreiter asked to admit through
Burton Miller was the best evidence available on the cost of
installing a sprinkler system in this particular building.

It

could easily have been presented in a way that completely removed
any prejudicial effect to the defendant.

The jury could have

been told the actual cost of installing the system without regard
to when the bid was obtained or from whom and to whom the
information was provided.
accommodating

the

In light of such a simple way of

interests

of

both parties

and

also allow

presentation of the most probative information to the jury, the
Courtfs ruling must be overturned.
D.

Schreiter has no obligation as part of her prima
facie case to present proof of Wasatch Manor's ability
to pay the cost of installing the sprinkler system.
The

trial

court

similarly

erred

when

it

required

Schreiter to show as part of its prima facie case that Wasatch
Manor had the ability to pay for the costs of putting in a
sprinkler system.

In fact, if Wasatch Manor felt that due to

financial constraints they were unable to provide a sprinkler
system, this is an argument in the nature of a defense that
Wasatch

Manor

bears

the

burden

of

presenting

and

proving.

Restatement (Second) of Torts 2a §288A(c)(1965).
This is especially true in light of the fact that the
question

of

what

financial

resources

defendant is something only it knows of.

are

available

to

the

It is an established

tenet that where knowledge of a particular fact is within the
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exclusive control of a defendant, that party rather than the
plaintiff bears the burden of going forward with evidence on that
issue.

Pace v. Hvmas. 726 P.2d 693, 697 (Id. 1986).
To adopt the defendant's position on this point would

lead to absurd results and allow unscrupulous defendants to take
advantage of victims of negligent acts.

If the plaintiff is

always required to prove that the defendant had the financial
resources to install safety devices, defendants could insure that
they escape liability by claiming poverty even in light of the
most financially reasonable precautionary measures.
E.

In the event Schreiter has the burden of presenting
prima facie evidence of financial ability to pay for
the cost of the sprinkler system, she has satisfied her
burden.
Even if a burden does exist, a prima facie showing was

presented by Schreiter to demonstrate that, in light of the
tremendous expense associated with a devastating fire, a more
than ample ability exists on the part of the defendant to pay the
costs of retrofitting the building with a sprinkling system.
Burton Miller, the building manager for the defendant, admitted
in his deposition that six years before the fire the building was
remodeled at a cost of approximately $500,000.
done on that remodeling was merely cosmetic.

Part of the work
The bill for

cleaning up after the fire was almost twice the estimate Miller
obtained for an entire sprinkling system!

It is difficult to

believe under these circumstances that a jury does not have a
basis to find the defendant had the financial capacity to install
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a potential lifesaving sprinkling system to guard against the
foreseeable

devastating

effects

of

a

fire

in

a

high-rise

retirement home.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's Order granting summary judgment is
based entirely on the claim that Schreiter has failed to present
a genuine issue of material fact about whether the defendant owed
a duty to Schreiter and whether it breached that duty.

Whether

such a duty and breach exist is a factual question to be resolved
by a jury in this case.

The trial court wrongfully excluded

evidence relating to the cost of a fire sprinkler system at
Wasatch

Manor.

Schreiterfs

Under

burden

to

the

facts

of

show

that

the

this

case

defendant's

it

is not
financial

resources were sufficient to pay the cost of a sprinkler system.
The Order granting summary judgment should be reversed and the
case remanded for a trial before a jury.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 9th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1992.
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES

7i^—^ s, (cBRIAN S. KING
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing
APPELLATE COURT BRIEF to be mailed, postage prepaid, on the 9th
day of November, 1992, to the following:
Gary Ferguson
WILLIAMS & HUNT
247 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ORDER
GRANTING
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Third Judfcic'C: -y,c!

MAY 2 2 1992
Bv.

K i\vAgj&a.

GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062)
Attorneys for Wasatch Manor
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 E. 200 S., Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DORA SCHREITER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
Civil No. 900907147

WASATCH MANOR, INC.
Defendant.

Honorable Richard H. Moffatt

Pursuant to proper notice, the defendant's First Motion
in Limine and Motion for Summary Judgment came on before the
Court with Brian S. King appearing on behalf of the plaintiff,
and Gary B. Ferguson appearing on behalf of the defendant.
Plaintiff's counsel represented to the Court that the
plaintiff did not oppose defendant's First Motion in Limine.
Plaintiff's counsel then argued plaintiff's Motion for
Continuance of Motion for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to Rule
56(f), Utah Rules of civil Procedure.

The Court denied

plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion to Continue the Motion for Summary
Judgment for reasons set forth hereafter.

Thereafter, both

counsel argued defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,

The

Court granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment for the
reasons set forth hereafter.
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court makes the following statement of its
findings:
1.)

With the granting of the defendant's First Motion

in Limine, the sole basis remaining for the plaintiff to assert
liability against defendant Wasatch Manor was a failure by
Wasatch Manor to have a fire sprinkling system in place on the
tenth floor of Wasatch Manor on February 7, 1990, the date of the
fire.
2.)

The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

asserted that summary judgment should be granted on the grounds
that the plaintiff cannot prove a prima facie case with respect
to the fire sprinkling system.

The missing elements were proof

as to the cost of the fire sprinkling system and the financial
ability of the defendant to pay for the system.

The defendant's

motion for summary judgment did not challenge any other element
of the plaintiff's negligence claim.
3.)

The only evidence the plaintiff had with respect

to cost of installing a fire sprinkling system was testimony of
Burton Miller, the manager of Wasatch Manor.

During a discovery

deposition, Mr. Miller testified that after the fire, Wasatch
Manor obtained a general estimate in the amount of $185,000.00 to
$200,000.00 as the cost of installing a fire sprinkler system.
-2-

The plaintiff had no other evidence of the cost of installing a
fire sprinkler system.
4.)

Defendant objected, pursuant to Rule 407, Utah

Rules of Evidence to the admissibility of this testimony arguing
that it was excluded as a subsequent remedial measure.
5.)

Counsel for the parties stipulated to the fact

that the Uniform Building Code in effect at the time Wasatch
Manor was built did not require the installation of a sprinkler
system.
6.)

Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion sought a continuance

in order to obtain expert testimony to establish that a fire
sprinkling system in Wasatch Manor would have been effective.
Counsel for the defendant conceded that a fire sprinkler system
would have been effective and agreed to limit the scope of the
motion for summary judgment solely to the question of whether the
plaintiff had presented a prima facie case as to whether, under
the circumstances of this case, Wasatch Manor was negligent for
failing to install a sprinkler system prior to February 7, 1990.
Counsel for the plaintiff accepted that stipulation, thereby
making plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion moot.
Based upon the foregoing, the court hereby orders,
judges and decrees:
1.

That plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion is denied on

the grounds of the party's stipulation, thereby making the motion
moot, and further on the grounds that the motion did not set
forth facts that would be essential for the plaintiff to oppose
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defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,

Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment was based upon a lack of evidence of cost and
financial ability.

Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion sought

additional time to establish facts that would show that a fire
sprinkling system would have been effective.

Further, the Court

notes that the complaint has been pending for over 17 months at
the time defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard.
Expert designation date was set of August 31, 1991.

Discovery

cutoff date was set as December 31, 1991 and continued to
February 28, 1992.

On March 23, 1991, the case was set for trial

to commence on May 11, 1992. The plaintiff has had more than
ample time to prepare her prima facie case and be in a position
to withstand the Motion for Summary Judgment filed after the
discovery cutoff date.

This is an additional basis for denial of

the Rule 56(f) motion.

The Court further finds that the

affidavits in support of plaintiff's Rule 56 motion were not
timely filed, thereby proving an additional basis for denial of
the Rule 56(f) motion.
2.)

That defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted on the grounds that the plaintiff has not established a
prima facie case of negligence against the defendant.

In order

to prove a prima facie case against the defendant Wasatch Manor
on the issue of the fire sprinkling system, the plaintiff must
show, as an element of her proof, the cost of installing the
sprinkling system and, separately, the ability for Wasatch Manor
to pay those costs.

Failure to prove either fact prevents the
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plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case.

The only

evidence presented to the court by the plaintiff on the issue of
cost of installing the sprinkler system was the testimony of
Burton Miller set forth above.

That testimony is not admissible

pursuant to the provisions of Rule 407, Utah Rules of Evidence.
The testimony does not fall within the feasibility exemption to
Rule 407*

The feasibility exemption applies only if there is an

issue as to whether or not the fire sprinkling system physically
can be installed.

Rule 407 evidences a strong public policy in

favor of encouraging tortfeasors to review the circumstances
surrounding an accident to determine whether or not something can
be done to prevent further accidents from happening.

This public

policy requires the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures undertaken by the tortfeasor, unless the activity falls
within one of the listed exemptions.

The efforts of Wasatch

Manor in obtaining a bid on the installation of a fire sprinkling
system is subsequent remedial conduct that does not fall within
any of the exceptions listed in Rule 407.
The only evidence of Wasatch Manor's ability to pay for
the fire sprinkler system was that Wasatch Manor remodeled the
building in 1984 at the approximate cost of $500,000. This
evidence, by itself, is insufficient, as a matter of law, to show
Wasatch Manor's ability to pay for a fire sprinkler system prior
to February 7, 1990.

Therefore, the plaintiff could not prove,

at the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment this portion of
her prima facie case.
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Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders that
judgment be entered in favor of the defendant, for no cause of
action, and that the defendant be awarded its costs incurred
pursuant to
of
*\J Rule
XVU.JLC 54(d)
«J-2\VAJ Utah/Rules
U L a U AVU1C9
\J JL Civil
V « i V J , i Procedure.
T
DATED this Q3

day of /v7^//^

, 1992.

BY "THEr-COU

HpNORABLE RICHARD

KZCF A

mFtfO&t^'*'
V3V

APPROVAL AS TO FORM:

G A ^ B\ FERGUSON
Attorney for Defendant

s.
BRIAN S. KING
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
Pursuant to Rule 4-501, mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing instrument this
day of
,
1992 by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Ronald E. Dalby, Esq.
Matthew J. Storey, Esq.
Brian King, Esq.
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE
4516 S. 700 E., #280
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
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RULE 56, URCP
RULE 407, URE

Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);

J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
" c i S - 49 CJ.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070,
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendants right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
t r i a l > o r f l l i n g 0 f necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
^55
*f™ to « ™ , n o t i c e °ff a PP l i c a t i ™ J * d e fault Judgment where notice is required only
by custom, 28 A.L.R 3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment <&> 92 to 134.
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
168
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Rule 56

action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.

Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 408

Rule 407, Subsequent remedial measures.
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable
to Rule 51, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Limited admissibility.
Inserts contained in drug packages containing instructions and warnings of possible side
effects were admissible where the inserts were
admitted for purpose of proving a defect in
drug under strict liability and specifically ex-

eluded for purpose of proving negligence and
there was sufficient evidence to support jury
verdict on negligence grounds. Barson ex rel.
Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832
(Utah 1984).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§§ 275, 628.
C.J.S. — 31A CJ.S. Evidence § 291; 65A
C.J.S. Negligence §§ 224, 225.
A.L.R. — Admissibility of evidence of post

injury warning measures undertaken by defendant, 38 A.L.R.4th 583.
Key Numbers. — Evidence *» 140, 219(1);
Negligence *» 131.

Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise.
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in
the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable
to Rules 52 and 53, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) but is broader to the extent that it exeludes statements made in the course of negotiations.

Cross-References. — Offer of judgment,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68.
Release or settlement of personal injury
claim, rescission or disavowal of, § 78-27-32.
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